Updated: February 20269 min read
Security Model
Threat model assumptions, crypto primitives, and what Quilon can/cannot access.
Crypto Primitives
- AES-256-CBC for confidentiality
- HMAC-SHA256 for integrity (encrypt-then-MAC)
- PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with 310,000 iterations for key derivation
- Timing-safe comparison for MAC verification paths
Zero-Knowledge Scope
User content is encrypted before transmission and decrypted client-side.
Server can observe session metadata needed for routing (for example socket IDs and approximate transfer shape), but not plaintext payload.
Threat Assumptions
- Client endpoints are trusted by their owner; compromised endpoint compromises local data
- TLS protects transport channel from passive network interception
- Backend compromise should not reveal plaintext clip/file content
- Abuse controls reduce but do not eliminate volumetric denial-of-service risk
Security Non-Goals
- Quilon does not provide endpoint malware protection
- Quilon does not hide traffic timing/volume metadata from network observers
- Quilon does not replace full DLP compliance tooling by itself
Full Security Policy
For full legal/security statement and disclosure process, see the dedicated security page.
Referencetext
https://quilon.dev/security